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1. The Risk of Looking for Security
Living in a “risk society,” exposed to the threat of possible future damages, 
we constantly look for security without ever finding it.1 The only area that 
today seems to be able to offer a kind of surrogate security is the economy, 
in a fascinating but also very curious way. Confronting the possibility of 
damage—to our business, but also to our home, family, and even to our 
bodies—we are offered the opportunity to take out insurance coverage. 
You can insure your wedding, but you can also get insured against divorce, 
you can insure against the risk of being abducted by aliens, you can insure 
almost all parts of your body, and you can also insure insurance (through 
reinsurance). Insurance seems to have become the depository of our need 
for security in all areas—all risks, no matter how different and incompara-
ble they are, are managed in the same form.2 In many languages the name 
itself (insurance, Versicherung, assicurazione) shows that the insurance 
policy is expected to offer security against the uncertainties of the future. 
1. On risk society, see Ulrich Beck, Die Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine 
andere Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), and Niklas Luhmann, Soziologie 
des Risikos (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991). Risk research has shown long ago that security is 
an empty concept, in the sense that the denial of risk does not lead to security but only to a 
different kind of risk: those who choose not to speculate on the stock exchange do not risk 
losing their money with a hazardous investment, but they run the risk that it will lose value 
because of inflation, or that it is stolen, or of not getting the profits that speculation would 
yield. The same applies to all risks: in the face of an open future, you can never be sure that 
there will not be danger.
2. See Alberto Cevolini, “Die Einrichtung der Versicherung als soziologisches Prob-
lem,” Sociologia Internationalis 48 (2010): 65–89.
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The insurance promises to protect against the eventuality of damages, and 
in this sense it should offer guarantees.
A closer look, however, shows that these guarantees are quite strange. 
The insurance does not ensure at all that the harm feared is not going 
to happen: you get sick even if you are insured, the house burns down 
the same, you can have a car accident. Indeed, the term “moral hazard” 
captures the fact that the probability of damage even increases: knowing 
to be insured, one tends to be less cautious, and therefore increases the risk 
of accidents. Put differently, the danger of the future increases. The car of 
the person who is insured against theft is much more likely to be stolen 
than that of the uninsured. Insurance merely guarantees that if the damage 
occurs, we are recompensed with money. This does not give us back our 
home or our health, but it does give us another kind of asset.
Curiously, this availability of money is interpreted practically every-
where in our society as a form of security. How can money offer an 
unspecified security, especially with regard to an unknown future? What is 
the link between the economy and the management of uncertainty?
In this essay I will address these issues, starting with the problem-
atic (and itself uncertain) relationship of the economy with uncertainty 
(section 2). In general terms, the economy does not welcome uncertainty. 
It is seen less as an opportunity than as an annoyance, which is prefer-
ably ignored—and, if necessary, attempted to be neutralized. Moreover, 
the recognition of uncertainty by economists came quite late; much later, 
at least, than its discovery in other areas of society. Section 3 describes 
the forms developed by modern society (in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century) to manage the spread of uncertainty. To the increasingly uncon-
trollable real reality, modern technologies for managing uncertainty have 
added other additional realities that are more controlled and reassuring, 
such as modern fiction and statistics. Both provide reliable references in a 
world that seems to get more and more elusive and complex.
But why is it the economy that people have eventually endowed with 
the hope of finding security? And what kind of security is this? Uncertainty 
concerns the future, and the fundamental tool of the modern economy—
money—can be seen as a means of managing in the present an unknowable 
future. Section 4 deals with the temporal nature of money, and section 5 
shows how finance takes this temporal logic to extremes. Selling and buy-
ing money, financial transactions actually buy and sell future availability.
Based on the use of models and sophisticated techniques of predic-
tion, the present management of the future promises to offer a form of 
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security that turns out to be incapable of managing just the most fascinat-
ing aspect of uncertainty: the continuous production of an always open 
and unpredictable future, which depends on present decisions and actions 
but is not bound by them. While promises of “risk neutralization” must 
remain empty, there is an alternative approach to dealing with uncertainty. 
Rather than considering uncertainty as a threat that needs to be eliminated, 
this alternative approach values it as a resource. Section 6 discusses a con-
crete example of this change in attitude, which does not attempt to predict 
one or several possible future courses, but rather predicts and encour-
ages the multiplication of surprises, and thus prepares people to face and 
learn from them.
2. The Discovery of Uncertainty
Economic theory has only recently discovered uncertainty. At first sight 
this claim may be counterintuitive. After all, the issue has been present for 
nearly a century, at least since Frank Knight’s book of 1921, which is now 
an essential reference for all thought on the topic.3 For a long time, how-
ever, the problem of uncertainty was seen as secondary and kept distant 
from mainstream economic theories. This changed only with the diffu-
sion, in recent decades, of “information economics.” Its many proponents, 
including Nobel laureates George Stigler, Alfred Stiglitz, and George 
Akerlof, arrive at uncertainty through the analysis of information and its 
economic relevance.
Information and uncertainty are apparently different issues. If one 
reflects on the concrete use of information, however, one soon comes to 
see that actors actually always operate with imperfect, i.e., incomplete 
and deficient information.4 At the moment of decision, they never have 
3. See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (London: The London School 
of Economics and Political Science, 1921). Keynes of course knew the problem of uncer-
tainty, and so did a group of scholars of high reputation but often of limited fame. Cf. 
G. L. S. Shackle, Uncertainty in Economics and other Reflections (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1955); Paul Davidson, “Some Misunderstandings on Uncertainty in Modern Classical 
Economics,” in Uncertainty in Economic Thought, ed. C. Schmidt (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1996), pp. 21–37; Hyman P. Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capi-
talist Processes and the Behavior of the Economy,” in Financial Crisis: Theory, History 
and Policy, ed. C. P. Kindleberger and J. P. Laffargue (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982) 
pp. 13–39; and Brian J. Loasby, Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1999).
4. From a sociological viewpoint the very expression “imperfect information” sounds 
curious: in the social field, information is always incomplete because it concerns the 
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all elements available. Decisions are therefore not made under condi-
tions of certainty and complete rationality, but rather under conditions 
of uncertainty. For this reason information and uncertainty are linked. 
This concerns, above all, situations in which one observes a dependency 
among actors (“adverse selection”) or an influence of the conditions of 
observation on the rationality of the decision (“moral hazard”). We see this 
with particular clarity in cases where one cannot observe the world (the 
information) without taking into account the perspective of the observer. 
Uncertainty is, in any case, likely to expand: once discovered, it spreads 
relentlessly to all aspects of decision-making and economic behavior. This 
is because the value and the sense of information always depend on how 
the others consider and use it, which is something one can never predict.
Even if we go back to Knight and Keynes, the discovery of uncertainty 
in economics occurs much later than the eruption of the topic in society 
as a whole, where it had fascinated people for centuries and posed knotty 
dilemmas. The era of uncertainty, in fact, was initially the Baroque age—
that rich and complex period between the second half of the sixteenth and 
the first half of the seventeenth century, in which Western society was 
faced with the dissolution of the image of society and cosmos as a compact 
unit that in different ways had been taken for granted until the early mod-
ern era.5 Gone was the idea that the natural and social world is structured 
by a single, certain, and unchanging order that humans would grasp if 
only their imperfection did not bind them to their doubts and errors. For 
those who were able to grasp it, information was believed to be perfect 
and univocal—one simply had to collect enough data, which, if correct, 
would all be in agreement. Uncertainty, where found, was only a problem 
relations between individuals who are mutually dependent on each other—we say that they 
operate under conditions of “double contingency” (Talcott Parsons, “Interaction: Social 
Interaction,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7 [New York: Mac-
millan Co. & The Free Press, 1968], p. 436). The information is not therefore “imperfect”; 
rather, it is the only form of information available—and its incompleteness is the founda-
tion of the very possibility of the social. This necessary incompleteness is symbolized by 
the “blind spot,” a partial blindness that is the condition for being able to see. See Heinz 
von Foerster, Observing Systems (Seaside, CA: Intersystems Publications, 1981), ch. 12. 
On the relationship between information and uncertainty in the economy, cf. Norman Clark 
and Calestous Juma, Long-Run Economics (London: Pinter, 1987), pp. 88ff.
5. See Erwin Panofsky, Idea: Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte der älteren Kunstthe-
orie (Leipzig: Teubner, 1924); Frank J. Warnke, Versions of Baroque: European Literature 
in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1972); Gustav R. Hocke, Die Welt 
als Labyrinth: Manier und Manie in der europäischen Kunst (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977).
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of men and of their limited capacity, and did not concern the world or the 
ultimate order of society. The world was and remained certain, even when 
human understanding was uncertain. Hence, uncertainty in itself was not 
a relevant issue deserving special attention; it was relegated to the stud-
ies of opinion and persuasion—separate and minor areas compared to the 
primary interest of investigating the truth.
For various reasons—which sociology has highlighted and continues 
to study6—the transition to modernity establishes a radically different 
approach in which uncertainty is promoted from a superficial to a cen-
tral concern of society. Surface itself, understood as appearance, becomes 
autonomous and relevant. New visual techniques, such as trompe-l’œil 
and perspective, demonstrate that appearances can be seen as independent 
from any correspondence with the real world. They can build a consistent 
world of their own. The Baroque era is a period of constant experimentation 
with paradoxes and appearances, deceptions and illusions.7 The growing 
awareness of the irreducibility and reality of uncertainty is accompanied 
by a strong sense of anguish. Uncertainty becomes a constitutive given 
of the world, which is not solely dependent upon human limitation and 
cannot be eliminated by any superior vision or by the gathering of infor-
mation, because it concerns the fact that the world is made not only of 
objects but also and above all of individual observers. These observers 
face the objects and the other observers from their unique and irreduc-
ible perspective. Neither is there, nor can there be, a vantage point that 
would condense the variety of observers into a single, correct perspective. 
A world of observers is never univocal and never certain; it changes over 
time and with the diversity of points of view.
This change of approach is particularly evident in reference to time. 
In pre-modern societies the relationship with time relied on an underlying 
certainty, even if men faced an obscure future and a past full of gaps. 
The authentic dimension of time, however, was considered to be an eter-
nity in which everything was fixed and necessary, from presently known 
past events to still unknown future facts. From the (divine) perspective of 
6. See Niklas Luhmann, Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik: Studien zur Wissens-
soziologie der modernen Gesellschaft, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), and 
Luhmann, Beobachtungen der Moderne (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992). See also 
Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
7. See Jean Rousset, La littérature de l’âge baroque en France: Circé et le paon 
(Paris: Corti, 1954), and Dorinda Outram, “Masks, Truth, and Nostalgia: Enlightenment 
Problems and Our Responses,” Figurationen: Gender Literatur Kunst 2 (2000): 93–107.
94  ELENA ESPOSITO
eternity, past, present, and future were contemporary and could all be con-
templated at the same moment. It was only to man, reduced as he was to 
the limited perspective of tempus, that time revealed itself gradually with 
the passing of the years and could thus reserve surprises. Such surprises 
were the corollary of imperfect knowledge.
Our sense of time is profoundly different, articulated in the horizons 
of a past that is no longer here and a future that is not here yet—and it 
is not here for anyone, not even for a superior being. No one can know 
in advance what will happen in the future, because the future is built by 
our actions and our expectations, in an ever different and surprising way. 
Today the future events do not exist in any sense, not even in a transcen-
dent one: the future exists only as a horizon of a present. That horizon 
provides an orientation for making decisions and choices of behavior.8 
The future is the realm of uncertainty par excellence: its uncertainty is 
radical and unavoidable, for it derives from our actions and projects, and 
simultaneously tends to thwart these projects by producing innovation and 
surprises. The open future of modern society is the recognition of a funda-
mental and irreducible uncertainty, and surprise is not the consequence of 
poor information: the better you are informed, in fact, the more radical and 
instructive the surprises will be.
3. Reality Doubling: Fiction and Statistics
The different ideas of time reflect the difference between a kind of inessen-
tial sense of uncertainty and one that is radical and cannot be eliminated. 
As mentioned above, this latter uncertainty was discovered by modern 
society in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Only the Baroque age, 
in fact, faced the problem of radical uncertainty directly. This explains 
why people reacted with anguish and humor, and experimented with 
deceptions and masking, artifices, and metamorphoses.9 Later times devel-
oped forms of managing uncertainty that made it possible to contain the 
spread of arbitrariness and instability. However, if the underlying change 
was the transition from an ordered cosmos to an unstable and contingent 
world, all later forms had to reckon with a more complex and articulated 
sense of reality.
8. See Luhmann, “The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern 
Society,” Social Research 43 (1976): 130–52, and Luhmann, Gesellschaftsstruktur und 
Semantik, pp. 235ff.
9. See Elena Esposito, Die Verbindlichkeit des Vorübergehenden: Paradoxien der 
Mode (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), ch. 3.
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In reaction to the uncertainty of reality, reality was multiplied.10 The 
problem of reality is different when the issue is not only to differentiate 
what is real from what is not (for example, illusion, deception, falsehood), 
but also and above all to distinguish several forms of reality, all real in 
their own way but different from each other. The difference between 
immanence and transcendence is one example, the differences among the 
various forms of Realitätsverdoppelung (reality doubling) are another.11 
One of these forms of reality doubling is fiction, as we can see in the 
“bourgeois novel” that emerges at the end of the seventeenth century. The 
novel narrates fictive events of invented characters. Regardless of this fic-
titious feature, however, what is written is not a lie.12 It is rather a more 
complex way to articulate reality inside itself, “doubling” it in a real reality 
and in a fictional reality that does not exist in the full sense but has its own 
structure and criteria. Although Robinson Crusoe never existed, it would 
be wrong to infer that he is a woman or a nobleman, and it would not be 
correct to say that his story takes place in Paris. Fiction creates its own 
references and its own world, which must be consistent and recognizable.
As people began to observe at this time, the fictional world must be 
“realistic.” It must be explicitly presented as an invention, and precisely 
for this reason must have features that lead the reader to think “it could 
be real.”13 Apparently only an avowedly unreal world can be realistic. 
Previous narratives were not a true doubling of reality but kept a vague 
relationship between the narrated events and the real world.14 The charac-
ters (heroes of the ancient epic, knights of the round table, saints and holy 
10. See Esposito, Die Fiktion der wahrscheinlichen Realität (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2007).
11. See Luhmann, Die Religion der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2000), pp. 58ff.
12. See Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957); Leonard 
J. Davis, Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel (New York: Columbia UP, 
1983); and Alissa G. Karl, “‘Bank Talk’, Performativity and Financial Markets,” Journal 
of Cultural Economy 6, no. 1 (2013): 63–77; here, p. 64. Already Philip Sidney was aware 
that fiction does not lie: “Now for the poet, he nothing affirmeth, and therefore never lieth” 
(Defense of Poesie [1595], in Prose Works, vol. 3, ed. Albert Feuillerat [Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 1962], p. 24).
13. As Mary Poovey observes, novels were and remain popular ”paradoxically . . . 
because they seem to refer to the actual world” (Genres of the Credit Economy: Mediating 
Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
2008], p. 21).
14. See William Nelson, Fact or Fiction: The Dilemma of the Renaissance Story-
teller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1973).
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figures), whose stories often referred to real historical events, experienced 
unrealistic adventures that were quite different from real life events. These 
fictional worlds abounded with spells and divine interventions, extraordi-
nary acts, and superhuman abilities. The stories were related to reality not 
by way of their plausibility—they were, in fact, utterly implausible—but 
by serving as models of moral or religious orientation. The “heroes” of 
the bourgeois novel, by contrast, usually do not set standards of moral 
and religious behavior, as they are normal people, very much like those 
one could meet in everyday experience (housemaids or sailors, teachers 
or landowners). Though they never existed, they are realistic characters.
The case of fiction illustrates a different relationship of reality with 
itself, or of society with the observation of the world. From the unitary 
model of previous societies (a unique reality) one moves to a reality dif-
ferentiated in several distinct areas—which may or may not exist—that 
contribute together to shape the expectations, the imaginations, and 
finally the experiences of the observers.15 Since the eighteenth century, 
each observer has been brought to build his image of the world and of 
himself, of his claims and hopes, on the basis of both direct experience 
and (especially) of his experience in the practice of fiction, referring to 
the adventures, loves, and ambitions of the characters of the novels. The 
fiction in novels, being explicit and declared, has real consequences and 
contributes to the image of reality for the observers, as well as to the con-
struction of what becomes, through the action for the observers, the real 
reality. Over the last few centuries our world has been duplicated in two 
separate kinds of reality—real reality and fictitious reality. Those who are 
not able to master this distinction do not have the skills required by a 
society of observers observing each other.16
Next to fiction, however, our society has simultaneously developed 
another way to deal with uncertainty and with the lack of complete 
15. Poovey tracks down in the same period, from the late seventeenth century onward, 
the need to manage in a more complex way the “problem of representation”: a relationship 
between signs and referents that becomes increasingly problematic. She identifies three 
sets of genres that around the same time developed different strategies to deal with this 
problem: imaginative writing (the novel), financial writing, and monetary genres (dealing 
with the abstraction of money, which stands for goods while not being a good itself). See 
Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy.
16. See Luhmann, Die Realität der Massenmedien (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1996), ch. 8.
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knowledge—or, in other words, with the imperfection of information. 
Probability theory was elaborated at the end of the seventeenth century 
as a “calculus of reasonableness,” designed to enable non-arbitrary 
decision-making when one does not have sufficient information.17 Direct 
knowledge of reality is supplemented by a statistical or inferential knowl-
edge, made of samples and projections, with its own rules and laws. These, 
however, do not concern or even aim to concern reality as such, but only 
our imperfect knowledge of reality and the constructions available on the 
basis of limited knowledge. The calculus of probabilities was developed 
as a calculus of ignorance and not as a form of knowledge of the world 
(a calculus of truth): its object is not nature but human error.18 Statistics 
does not work with the real world (which turned out to be uncertain and 
unreliable) but with models that overlap the intransparent world in order 
to offer an orientation. Here again, a second structured and non-arbitrary 
reality is constructed, separated from the real reality in order to shape what 
becomes a “reasonable” orientation in a world dominated by uncertainty. 
The indications obtained from statistics (like the experiences drawn from 
fiction) are used in order to decide real behavior, which then becomes (as 
in all cases of Realitätsverdoppelung) the result of the difference between 
two distinct orders of reality.
Statistics, like fiction, neither describes nor “imitates” the real real-
ity but builds a second reality, more structured and manageable than the 
uncertain world modern society has to face. This reality is used to elimi-
nate arbitrariness and to govern contingency, to behave in a “reasonable” 
way when rationality becomes doubtful and unattainable. If in fiction the 
awareness of its artificial nature is always present (even when one cries 
because of the death of the main character), in statistics, instead, the dis-
tance from the real reality is often not entirely clear. This is due to the 
complexity of internal differentiations between descriptive, inferential, 
or inductive statistics, or to the debate between objective and subjective 
17. See Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 1988), p. 60; Michael Smithson, Ignorance and Uncertainty: Emerging 
Paradigms (New York: Springer, 1989), p. 51; Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical 
Thinking, 1820–1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1986), p. 72; Edmund F. Byrne, Prob-
ability and Opinion: A Study in the Medieval Presuppositions of Post-Medieval Theories 
of Probability (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Prob-
ability (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975).
18. See Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, p. 72.
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interpretation. The description of the fictional reality is often treated as if 
it were a description of the (uncertain) real reality.19
4. Money and Future Needs
In a society predominantly oriented to the uncertainty of the future, the 
economy is the field that deals in the present with a variant of this uncer-
tainty. The economy deals with the concern for the future capacity to 
satisfy needs that may arise in the future. We are worried in the present 
about our future ability to satisfy needs that cannot yet be known.
From this perspective, the object of economics is, first of all, time. 
Without referring to time one cannot understand economics, its function-
ing, and its role for society as a whole. It is Keynes, again, who said this, 
and he was supported later on by other authors like Shackle and previous 
thinkers like Voegelin.20 It is for this reason that economics turns to statis-
tical fiction and integrates it in its mechanisms in such a deep way that it 
runs the risk of being blinded by it.21 Statistics promises to deal with the 
uncertainty of time, and this is the basic problem of the modern monetary 
economy.
The basic tool of the modern economy is money, and money cannot 
be understood without reference to time. Indeed, in its essence “money 
is saved time,” and its operations must be explained in the first place by 
referring to time and its management.22 This sociological perspective is in 
line with Shackle’s claim that the function of money can be understood 
only by referring to time. More than as a unit of account, a medium of 
19. See Jens Beckert, “Imagined Futures: Fictionality in Economic Action,” Max-
Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne: MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/8 (2011), 
p. 11.
20. See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (London: Macmillan, 1936). For G. L. S. Shackle, see his Business, Time and 
Thought (London: Macmillan, 1988), and Time, Expectations and Uncertainty in Econom-
ics, ed. James L. Ford (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990). For Eric Voegelin, see “Die Zeit 
in der Wirtschaft,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 53 (1925): 186–211.
21. See Brian Snowdon, Howard Vane, and Peter Wynarczyk, A Modern Guide 
to Macroeconomics: An Introduction to Competing Schools of Thought (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 1994); Roger E. Backhouse, Economists and the Economy: The Evolution 
of Economic Ideas (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1994); Robert Heilbroner and William 
Milberg, The Crisis of Vision in Modern Economic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1995), pp. 44ff. and 101ff.
22. Christoph Deutschmann, “Soziologie kapitalistischer Dynamik,” Max-Planck-
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne: MPlfG Working Paper 09/05 (2009), p. 20.
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exchange, or a store of value (its “classical” functions23), money is actu-
ally a “medium of deferment and of search” that serves to address and 
handle the uncertainty of the future.24 Money, one could say, incorporates 
the future: it stands for the possibility to act and for the availability of 
alternatives in a time to come, which is still unknown (as is always the 
case). Owning money makes available these options, even if the options 
are yet unknown: since everything contributes to capital, everything can 
be translated into a sum of money (as long as others are ready to accept it).
In this interpretation, too, the point of reference of the economy are 
the needs that under conditions of scarcity activate a complex social 
dynamics.25 With the introduction of money and its increasing autono-
mous circulation, future needs become the central problem; the economy 
reflects the present concern for what will be needed in a still unknown 
time to come. The present defines itself as the past of a future it tries to 
prepare, where it sees first of all a multiplicity of possible needs. I do not 
know what I will need tomorrow, but I would like to act in such a way 
as to ensure that I will be able to get it. If I have money, I know that in 
the future I will be able to satisfy my needs, and I already know it today 
even if I do not know them. Therefore money provides a guarantee against 
the uncertainty of the future; this is why there is never enough money. If 
present needs can be finite, future needs are never exhausted, because the 
future is and remains unknown.
The great relevance of the economy in modern society, its often amaz-
ing ability to motivate, and the obsessive value it can assume are related 
to its fundamental relationship with the future, with uncertainty, and with 
the unspecific assurance that money seems to offer. The economy, which 
in its modern form manages money,26 manages the relationship between 
23. Cf., among many others, Marc Bloch, Esquisse d’une histoire monétaire de 
l’Europe (Paris: Colin, 1954); Geoffrey Ingham, “Introduction,” in Concepts of Money: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives from Economics, Sociology and Political Science (Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 2005), p. xiii; also Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol. 1 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1922).
24. Shackle, Time, Expectations and Uncertainty in Economics, p. 213; see also 
Shackle, Epistemics & Economics: A Critique of Economic Doctrines (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1972), p. 160, and Paul Davidson, Money and the Real World (London: 
Macmillan 1978), p. 146.
25. See Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1988), pp. 59ff.
26. In a functionally differentiated society the specific operation of the economy are 
payments—not production, nor the consumption of goods. Cf. Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft 
der Gesellschaft, pp. 131ff.
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present and the future—the uncertainty of the open future and its construc-
tion. What will be possible in the future depends on what we do or do not 
do today. In their monetary form, moreover, these possibilities are already 
handled and managed in the present. Credit shows this: it creates wealth 
through the present use of a future availability, which is anticipated by 
the creditor and should offer the possibility to get more than the antici-
pated sum.27 This, of course, develops a huge potential, which, however, 
generates a high complexity. Finance takes to extremes the use of money, 
i.e., the management of the future in the present. Finance, therefore, 
takes the use of fiction to extremes and reveals its contradictions in the 
most explicit way.
5. The Use of the Future in Financial Operations
The modern, monetarized economy manages the uncertainty of the future 
through money. It manages present possibilities to produce future possi-
bilities, which are always uncertain because they do not yet exist and will 
be the product of present decisions (whether our own or those of others 
observing one another). The monetarized economy, in short, faces extraor-
dinary contingency. It is not surprising that modern economics resorts to 
the use of models, and that these models are mainly based on statistics—
which, as we have already seen, builds a fictitious reference that allows 
us to manage uncertainty with certain procedures. Statistics promises to 
manage in the present the uncertainty of the future. Facing an uncertain 
future, the monetarized economy therefore turns to statistics in order to 
gain a means of orientation that is non-arbitrary and controlled.
27. This, incidentally, is the reason why throughout the Middle Ages credit was 
harshly condemned by the Church: it created wealth through the use of time, but time 
does not belong to man but to God, who gave man the chance to live it, not manipulate 
it. Cf. Jacques Le Goff, La bourse et la vie: Économie et religion au Moyen Age (Paris: 
Hachette, 1986); Karl Pribram, A History of Economic Reasoning, vol. 1, The Development 
of Economics into an Independent Discipline, Thirteenth through Eighteenth Centuries 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1983), pp. 35ff.; and Joel Kaye, Economy and Nature in the 
Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), pp. 19ff. The moneylender is worse than the thief. 
Like the thief, he appropriates something that does not belong to him. But while the thief 
steals from another man, the moneylender steals from God. The stigmatization of debt 
and its social presuppositions has been reinterpreted by David Graeber (Debt: The First 
5,000 Years [New York: Melville House, 2011]) in a proposal to set credit as the primary 
economic given from which coins and the market will later be deduced.
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However, economics does not always remain aware of this fictitious 
character of its models, especially when its constructions become more 
refined from a computational point of view: the complexity and rigor of 
calculations often operate as substitutes of empirical reference. This ten-
dency, with its related lack of transparency, has become much stronger in 
recent decades, in correspondence with the so-called “financialization” of 
the economy.28 Observing the evolution and problems of finance, one can 
actually also observe the relationship between economics and uncertainty, 
its advantages and blindness.
The ongoing processes are numerous and complex, and they reveal, as 
a whole, what we could call a prevalence of the fictional over the real.29 Fic-
tion makes itself autonomous and follows its own criteria, just as finance 
seems to get increasingly independent from production, or the “virtual” 
aspect of the economy from real processes. As in all cases of fiction, real-
ity results from the combined contribution of both components, even if 
it appears difficult to maintain an awareness of the distinction, i.e., of a 
reality given as the difference between real reality and fictitious reality.
Financial operations buy and sell money. If time is money, as Shackle 
and many others maintain, it follows that finance buys and sells time. And 
if it is true that time is articulated in a real present and a fictional future30 
(in the form of one or many fictitious realities), the prevalence of fiction 
corresponds to a prevalence of the future over the present. However, the 
construction of the future is handled as if it were the real reality. In other 
words, finance has recourse to formalized models (e.g., CAPM, value-at-
risk, etc.) that no longer take as their main object goods and services but 
rather the direct management of risk. Financial risk management largely 
relies on derivatives, whose interesting feature is their reference to goods 
or assets only in the form of the “underlying”: what is sold and bought 
is a “promise,” i.e., the future possibility of performing an operation on 
the underlying.31 Those who buy a derivative buy the possibility to do 
28. Cf. Christoph Deutschmann, “Limits to Financialization: Sociological Analysis 
of the Financial Crisis,” Archives of European Sociology LI.3 (2011), pp. 250ff., who 
describes, with many references to the literature, a continuous process over the last thirty 
years, linked to the growing dominance of the FIRE (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) 
sector.
29. Cf. more thoroughly, Elena Esposito, The Future of Futures: The Time of Money 
in Financing and Society (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), ch. 7.
30. Besides the past, of course.
31. Cf. Edward J. Swan, Building the Global Market: A 4000 Year History of Deriva-
tives (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000).
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something in the future, regardless of what will happen and how reality 
will develop. What they buy is, in a sense, a bit of future.32
These operations of dealing with risk—i.e., with the future—are orga-
nized into models that perform a large amount of operations and combine 
them in an extremely complex way, using statistical formalizations and 
computer calculations. The various operations would ideally compensate 
each other, diversifying and articulating the overall risk of the invest-
ment through the construction of a series of scenarios that would cover 
all the possibilities of market evolution. The models claim to consider all 
possible future courses and to develop a strategy for each of them. They 
promise a “risk-neutral” world, in which the inevitable risk of an open 
(hence unpredictable) future is not deleted (which is, evidently, impos-
sible) but rendered harmless. One does not know which future will come, 
but one can count on having a strategy ready for any of them.
The problem is that this risk-neutral world, as any future elaborated 
by calculation, is a fiction like statistics, an alternative reality with its own 
rules and criteria. It is defined as different from, not identical with, real 
reality. The future courses considered by the models are only “present 
futures” (in the sense developed by Koselleck: horizons of the future from 
the perspective of the now current present, on the basis of today’s available 
information and knowledge)33—or, at best, all possible futures that can be 
constructed from the perspective generated by the available information of 
the present. The neutralization of risk only concerns these fictitious future 
realities. The real future reality (the “future present”)34 will be something 
different: it will not be a fiction, even if fiction prepares and affects it.
The complexity of the situation, and the ingenuity of the use of mod-
els, however, does not lie in the fact that fictions are not real; quite the 
opposite. They are real descriptions of a fictitious world. As all forms of 
fiction, the predictions of models are real data that have an impact on the 
course of the world and on financial markets.35 They exist as predictions, 
32. See Esposito, The Future of Futures, ch. 8.
33. See Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zei-
ten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979).
34. See Luhmann, “The Future Cannot Begin.”
35. They are as real as Merton’s prophecies, which are fulfilled only if they are wrong 
(or only by chance). To paraphrase Merton, self-fulfilling prophecies start from a wrong 
premise, which, however, is believed, giving rise to behaviors that change the situation and 
a posteriori make the description real. Self-defeating prophecies do the same, but in the 
opposite direction: they were right, but become false as a consequence of their spreading. 
This perpetuates a “regime of error” and, in our terms, an irreducible situation of uncer-
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and the very fact that they have been communicated contributes to the 
course of events, producing an additional piece of information they did not 
(and could not) take into account. This makes the right prediction false. 
So financial models calculate all possible present futures, and thereby 
contribute to the realization of the only future they could not foresee: the 
“future present” that results, in part, from the use and the consequences of 
models.36
This circularity between the predictions of the models and the devel-
opment of reality has produced the widespread perception that finance 
is “stealing the future” of society. Binding all possible future courses, 
finance is seen as eliminating the possibilities on which plans and hopes 
are built. This accusation, however, uses the same logic as the models: the 
calculated future is expected to coincide with the real future. Yet the latter 
comes about in its own way: the more we try to plan it, the more surprising 
and unpredictable it will be. The extremely high—“wild”—volatility of 
markets in recent times attests to this. The future cannot be stolen, simply 
because it does not exist. The protest, however, signals an important point: 
the “colonization” of the future by finance did not neutralize risk (which is 
impossible) but the awareness of risk. It is this awareness that creates the 
drive to experiment and produce possibilities in order to see how they will 
evolve, and to learn how to proceed. If the binding of future possibilities 
entails forgetting about the fictitious character of predicted futures, the 
room for experimentation and learning narrows.
6. Uncertainty as a Resource
Can we imagine a different, more productive use of uncertainty? Uncer-
tainty is not only a threat but can also be a great opportunity for decisions 
and for the construction of the future.37 Could we use fiction in a way that 
tainty: the true statements become false, and the false ones can become true—but not all 
of them. And the criteria to discriminate the “right falsities” from the “wrong” ones remain 
unknown. See Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social 
Action,” American Sociological Review 1 (1936): 894–96, 898–904.
36. Benoît Mandelbrot examines this process following the evolution of implied 
volatility, taken as a measure of the turbulence (hence the riskiness) of markets. He shows 
that when the use of models is stabilized, a “skew” is produced that reveals that in the real 
development of markets the probable trends become improbable and the improbable ones 
become probable. See Benoît Mandelbrot and Richard L. Hudson, The (Mis)Behavior of 
Markets: A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, and Reward (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
37. David Stark suggests to move from the passive attitude of the one facing sur-
prises “out there” in the environment, to the active attitude of an organization generating 
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takes to heart Shackle’s insights into the positive value of the imagination 
and its essential role in the decision-making process in the economy?38
This proposal sounds very abstract, but it actually corresponds to 
procedures that are already used in the economic world, especially (not 
surprisingly) in finance. In a recent article, Paul Langley describes the 
transition of financial risk management from probabilistic calculations to 
non-statistical risk measures.39 This new outlook is a consequence of the 
financial crisis and the failure of the models that promised to manage and 
neutralize risk (typically VAR or “value at risk”). As we have seen, they 
relied on historical data as a guide to future events. In the occurrence of 
high-impact, low-probability events that do not have any historical prece-
dents, these models lose all effectiveness. For this reason, the new approach 
moves to anticipatory techniques for governing the future in the present. 
These techniques abandon any hypothesis of continuity with the past and 
“work within, rather than against, the idea that the future is unknown.”40
purposefully “perplexing situations” and using ambiguity in order to “exploit uncertainty” 
(The Sense of Dissonance: Accounts of Worth in Economic Life [Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
UP, 2009], p. 6). In an apparently similar way, a “cultivation of strategic unknowns” as a 
resource has recently been suggested: the use of ambiguity and of “known unknowns” to get 
more decisional freedom and to absolve inaction or wrong decisions. See Linsey McGoey, 
“Strategic Unknowns: Towards a Sociology of Ignorance,” Economy and Society 41, no. 1 
(2012): 1–16, and William Davies and Linsey McGoey, “Rationalities of Ignorance: On 
Financial Crisis and the Ambivalence of Neo-Liberal Epistemology,” Economy and Soci-
ety 41, no. 1 (2012): 64–83. Ignorance and uncertainty, however, are different: uncertainty 
is circular and operational: it concerns an insuperable and continually reproduced lack of 
information, because it depends on the behavior of the decision maker himself. Ignorance, 
instead, is presented as an inevitable condition of the world and of knowledge (McGoey 
goes back to Socrates), due simply to the limits of the decision maker. Ignorance could 
be reduced by increasing the available information—uncertainty could not, because even 
the complexity of the relationships and their effects would increase. The strategies for the 
exploitation of uncertainty are different and more complex than the more traditional strate-
gies for the exploitation of ignorance (typically in politics) and always include a moment 
of reflexivity.
38. Being uncertain about the future, actors cannot rely on traditional rationality. 
Nevertheless they do not behave irrationally nor follow uncontrolled fantasy. Actors rely 
on “constrained imagination” based on what one knows to be plausible at that time. See 
G. L. S. Shackle, Imagination and the Nature of Choice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1979). 
According to Poovey, the relation of the economy with fiction is “an increasingly compli-
cated, increasingly misrecognized relationship of mutual indebtedness masked by mutual 
disavowal and misunderstanding” (Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy, p. 9).
39. Paul Langley, “Anticipating Uncertainty, Reviving Risk? On the Stress Test of 
Finance in Crisis,” Economy and Society 42, no. 1 (2013): 51–73.
40. Ibid., p. 69.
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The relationship with the future is completely different here. The 
new techniques do not try to stop a future event from happening, but very 
pragmatically aim to “prepare” the system to deal with an unforeseen and 
unpredictable future. The specific example discussed by Langley is the 
SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program), the crisis management 
enacted by the U.S. administration since 2009 and known as the bank 
stress test. This program uses the available historical data and quanti-
fied assumptions about economic data like GPD growth, unemployment 
rate, and house pricing; not, however, in order to project them forward 
but rather to imagine forward-looking “what if”–scenarios that include 
subjective assessments and identify a number of factors considered 
particularly relevant. Fiction (statistics) is not rejected, but it is used to 
imagine, in a controlled way, alternative hypotheses that are “severe but 
plausible”41—or, as we would say: realistic, but not real. These factors 
and scenarios are then used to test the vulnerability of banks. Crucially, 
they are largely independent of statistical probability: the imagined events 
have a low degree of probability, yet they would have a substantial impact 
on the state of finance were they to come true. A bank passes the test if it 
proves to be properly prepared to handle the occurrence of these events.
Interweaving “the imaginative and probabilistic, the novel and histori-
cal,” this approach successfully uses fiction and statistics to “govern by 
uncertainty.”42 It does not reject formalization, but uses it to learn, not to 
predict—to get prepared for surprises, not for precise events.
The difference can be seen in the management of the inevitable 
performative effect of models, which, as we have seen, is usually their 
weakness. In this case performativity is expected and even exploited: the 
model “expects” that the markets react to the test—but not so much to 
its results (which concern highly improbable and hence little informative 
events) but rather to the fact that the test has been carried out (literally: 
performed). And the results show the whole circularity of performativity, 
which is based on possibilities, not on facts. The program was part of CAP 
(Capital Assistance Program) and presupposed the availability of funds to 
intervene concretely to heal situations at risk, but the success of the test 
made the use of CAP funds unnecessary. The possibility had to be avail-
able in order to not have to be used.
41. Ibid., p. 56.
42. Ibid., p. 55.
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The very success of the project relies to a large extent on the manage-
ment of the possible. It is based not on a real intervention in the situation 
of banks (funding) but rather on an action designed to (performatively) 
activate the self-observation of markets. The aim was to restore con-
fidence, and it worked. The program is considered the beginning of the 
end of the crisis in the United States. But this confidence did not rely on 
positive data. The results of the stress tests in the United States referred 
to very unlikely events that, precisely because of their unlikelihood, had 
very little informative value in themselves. Moreover, the results were by 
and large negative. Taken literally they should have projected a threaten-
ing and worrisome future. The return of confidence—of a positive image 
of the future—was not based on what is known in the present but on the 
expectation that the unknown future will be addressed with competence. 
In other words, the return to confidence resulted from the perception of the 
preparedness of banks to manage the unknown and from the credibility of 
the administration and its tests—as shown by the negative results. No one 
knows what will happen, and the simulated events had a very low degree 
of probability; but it is assumed that, whatever happens, the banks will be 
able to handle surprises.
Paradoxically, then, the negative result of the banks tests activates a 
positive dynamics in the markets, while a positive result tends to activate 
a negative dynamics (in accordance with the circular structure of self-ful-
filling and self-defeating prophecies). This is borne out by the case of the 
European Union, which adopted a similar stress test. In Europe only seven 
banks out of ninety-one were deemed unreliable, but this apparently reas-
suring figure had no positive effect on market confidence. The prevailing 
opinion is that the stress test failed in Europe—presumably because it did 
not provide information about the ability to handle future surprises, i.e., 
about the ability to use uncertainty. The lack of credibility of the institu-
tions and the way in which the test was carried out made it ineffective for 
the management of the future.
This example can be read as a demonstration of Shackle’s exhortation 
to deal with uncertainty as a resource rather than as a problem to be neu-
tralized. If the future were knowable there would be nothing to imagine 
and to project. The alternative to reality would be mere fantasy, without 
connection to reality and its constraints and without prospect of being 
accomplished. The beauty of the future, instead, is that it is not here but 
will be—in a non-random way. Future reality depends on today’s choices 
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and decisions, even if we cannot predict or determine them. This is the 
fundamental resource of planning and the challenge for those who work 
with “real fictions,” such as models and formalizations. Tapping into this 
resource requires awareness, when referring to reality, of the fact that cor-
rectness is essential in order to produce effects and to understand what 
is happening, even though these effects will (almost) always be differ-
ent from those we could expect. Fiction cannot and does not want to be 
the image of reality, and we should not expect it to be. Without fiction, 
however, one could expect nothing—at least not in the sense of controlled 
expectations, structured by models. Nor could one learn from experience 
and thus change one’s expectations in order to produce a new future, ever 
different and surprising.
